We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether pre-play communication mitigates opportunistic behavior in a person-to-person lending context. We implement a trust game in which the investment income of the borrower (second-mover) is uncertain and not revealed to the lender (first mover). In this "hidden action" condition lenders cannot distinguish strategic defaults from forced defaults. We compare a treatment in which the borrower can send pre-play text messages to the lender to a treatment without such communication. We find that communication does not have a significant positive effect on credit volumes or repayment rates in this hidden action condition. We compare these findings to the effect of communication in a baseline condition in which borrower income is deterministic and strategic defaults cannot be hidden from lenders. In this baseline condition, communication leads to higher credit volumes and repayment rates implying higher payoffs for both lenders and borrowers. Comparing borrower communication and behavior in the hidden action condition to the baseline condition we find that borrowers are much more likely to renege on promises to repay in the hidden action treatment.
Introduction
A large body of evidence in economics and psychology suggests that non-binding pre-play communication mitigates opportunistic behavior in social dilemma games (Balliet, 2009; Sally, 1995) , improves contract design and efficiency (Brandts et al. , 2015) , promotes ethical behavior in groups (Ellman & Pezanis-Christou, 2010 ) and helps overcoming coordination failures (Cooper et al. , 1992; Crawford, 1998) .
1 In particular, the exchange of promises between agents can foster trust and cooperation as players feel obliged to keep their promises (Vanberg, 2008) or to meet the payoff expectations which their promises induce (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007) .
Credit markets are plagued by asymmetric information and thus potential opportunistic behavior. Borrowers may misrepresent their creditworthiness, choose actions which jeopardize loan repayment, or hide their ability to repay loans. Theory and evidence suggest that contractual arrangements (e.g., collateral) and market institutions (e.g., credit bureaus) arise to mitigate such opportunistic behavior by borrowers (see, e.g., Freixas & Rochet, 2008) . This literature also highlights the importance of lender-borrower relationships as a mechanism for lenders to learn about borrowers over time (Sharpe, 1990) , and to install dynamic incentives (Boot et al. 1994) . By contrast, the role of personal interaction in facilitating efficiency enhancing communication between lenders and borrowers has hardly been researched.
Understanding the role of communication in lender-borrower relationships is important given the recent surge in online lending in retail credit markets. Online lending accounts for up to one-third of the U.S. consumer credit market, 2 as well as eight percent of the U.S. mortgage market Fuster et al. (2018) . With online lending, lenders and borrowers no longer engage in personal interaction through which borrowers may make explicit promises to repay loans. As a consequence, moral obligations by borrowers to repay loans may be weakened.
Does the absence of borrower-lender communication reduce repayment morale and credit market efficiency? Not necessarily. Existing experimental studies on the effect of communication focus on strategic interaction in deterministic economic environments (see, e.g., Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009) . In these environments, observed outcomes perfectly reveal the behavior of the trading partner. In credit markets by contrast, there is also exogenous uncertainty, as borrowers are exposed to potential income or expenditure shocks. In such economic environ-not increase average borrower or lender payoffs. Difference-in-difference estimates confirm a weaker impact of communication on credit volume and payoffs in the hidden action condition compared to the baseline condition.
Our conjecture is that in the hidden action condition the impact of communication on credit market performance is undermined, because borrowers can more easily hide opportunistic behavior. Lenders anticipate that borrowers may be more likely to renege on promises to repay in this condition and are thus less likely to extend large loans to borrowers who promise to repay. Our data supports this mechanism: We find that borrowers are equally likely to use pre-play communication in both conditions but are more likely to renege on promises to repay in the hidden action condition than in the baseline condition. Lenders are less likely to offer large loans to borrowers who promise to repay in the hidden action condition compared to the baseline condition.
An alternative explanation for the weaker impact of communication in our hidden action condition is a direct effect of uncertainty: In the hidden action condition lender incomes are in expectation lower than in the baseline condition, because some borrowers are forced to default. As a consequence lenders may be less likely to extend credit, even when borrowers can communicate with them. We do not find support for this mechanism: We implement an additional condition in which the ability of a borrower to repay is stochastic but borrower income and thus the repayment decision is revealed to the paired lender after each period. In this "revealed action" condition the positive impact of communication on credit volume and payoffs is restored.
Our paper contributes to the literature on communication and trust in behavioral economics and psychology (see, e.g., Cooper & Kühn, 2014; Balliet, 2009; Lei et al. , 2014) . Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) provide first empirical evidence on the effect of communication in stochastic economic conditions. They find that communication increases trust and trustworthiness in situations with low levels of uncertainty and hidden action. Our experiment, differs from Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) in two key dimensions. First, our hidden action condition features significant uncertainty about the ability of borrowers to repay. Second, we benchmark the effect of communication in our hidden action condition to its effect in a baseline condition without uncertainty. 4 Our experiment demonstrates that when economic uncertainty is suffi-4 Our experiment further differs from Charness & Dufwenberg in that it was computerized and conducted in the anonymous setting of the lab. Charness & Dufwenberg conduct a pen and paper experiment in classrooms where subjects are separated by roles (sender or receiver of messages). In Charness & Dufwenberg subjects further only make one decision while our experiment gathers more observations on the individual level when subjects decide on credit sizes and repayment in several periods. Lastly, the strategy set is broader in our experiment (lenders can decide on a credit size from a set of four credits and borrowers decide on repayment for each credit size). Charness & Dufwenberg limit the decision space to binary choices (trust/do not trust and ciently high and opportunistic behavior can thus be well concealed the effect of communication is significantly weakened.
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We also contribute to the literature on repayment behaviour in retail credit markets. Recent evidence suggests that a significant share of mortgage defaults during the U.S. subprime crisis were strategic: Households walked away from homes in which they had negative equity (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011; Ghent & Kudlyak, 2011) . Guiso et al. (2013) show that moral constraints and social norms influences the propensity of households to default strategically on a mortgage. We contribute to this literature by showing that pre-contractual communication between borrowers and lenders may strengthen repayment morale. But communication is less effective in deterring strategic default if borrowers can hide opportunistic behavior from lenders.
Finally, our findings contribute to the literature on relationship lending. This literature argues that repeated interaction between lenders and borrowers improves credit access, especially for opaque borrowers and in markets where contract enforcement is difficult (Kysucky & Norden, 2015) . Relationship lending reduces information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers Sharpe (1990) and provides borrowers with dynamic incentives to repay (Boot & Thakor, 1994) . We contribute to this literature by examining under what conditions personal interaction between borrowers and lenders may foster loan repayment. Recent field experiments document that post contract text-message reminders from lenders to borrowers fosters loan repayment (Bursztyn et al. , forthcoming; Karlan et al. , 2016) . Our evidence qualifies the potential role of lender-borrower communication in enhancing credit market outcomes. We show that pre-contact communication between borrowers and lenders does not foster loan repayment when borrowers can easily conceal strategic defaults.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present and discuss the experiment design. In Section 3 we provide theoretical predictions by treatment and derive testable hypothesis for our cross-treatment comparisons. In Section 4, we present our results and Section 5 discusses our findings.
be trustworthy/not being trustworthy) in presence and absence of communication.
5 The results of our study also add to the literature on lying aversion (see, e.g., Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy et al. , 2013; López-Pérez & Spiegelman, 2013; Vanberg, 2017) , truth telling (see, e.g., Abeler et al. , 2016; Ellingsen &Östling, 2010; Kartik et al. , 2007 Kartik et al. , , 2014 Matsushima, 2008) and promise keeping (see, e.g., Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg, 2008) . Our findings are in line with recent experimental evidence by Gneezy et al. (2018) who show that people lie more often when their actions cannot be observed by an experimenter. Our data support a model in which communication increases (psychological) cost of lying (breaking a promise) but these cost are substantially smaller when lying cannot be detected.
2 Experimental Design
Trust Game
We implement a repeated trust game with a strangers matching protocol. Subjects are randomly assigned to be either a borrower (she) or a lender (he) in a matching group of 10 subjects (5 lenders and 5 borrowers) for 10 periods. In each period, one borrower and one lender out of a matching group interact with each other. In each period lenders and borrowers have the same endowment of 150 points. Lenders can issue a loan of 10, 40, 70 or 100 points from their endowment to the paired borrower. A loan yields an investment return of four times the credit size to the borrowers. Hence, if a borrower receives a credit of 10 (40, 70, 100) points, she gets a return of 40 (160, 280, 400) point, respectively.
Borrowers decisions are elicited with the strategy method: They decide to repay or not for each of the possible credit sizes before they are informed about the credit choice of the paired lender. We fix repayments to 2.5 times the credit size. Thus, a borrower's repayment obligation for a credit of 10 (40, 70, 100) points is 25 (100, 175, 250) points. This parameter choice enables borrowers to implement an equal split of income between themselves and the paired lender for every credit size.
In this baseline trust game the payoff of the lender is given by his endowment minus the credit size plus the repayment by the borrower. The payoff of the borrower is given by her endowment plus the investment return minus the repayment. Table 1 presents the lender and borrower payoffs for each credit size and repayment choice. 10  40  25  165  190  165  140  40  160  100  210  310  210  110  70  280  175  255  430  255  80  100  400  250  300  550  300  50 Note: Trust game payoffs for borrowers and lenders for each credit size with repayment and without repayment.
After borrowers and lenders make their decision, the period payoffs are realized. Borrowers and lenders are then randomly re-assigned to new pairs within their matching group for the next period. Borrowers and lenders learn only their own payoffs at the end of each period. To facilitate learning, we provide lenders in period six with the information about the total number of issued credits by size, the total number of repaid credits by credit size and the 6 average earnings of lenders by credit size in period 1-5.
6 Furthermore, in period one, five and ten, lenders were asked to state their belief about how many borrowers in their matching group will repay their credits. 7 Lender beliefs were not incentivized.
Main Treatments
Our aim is to study how the ability of borrowers to hide opportunistic behavior affects the impact of communication on lending. To this end we study four main treatments in a 2x2 design.
First, we vary the borrowers' ability to hide opportunistic behavior. In our "baseline" condition described above, the borrower's income is deterministic: She always yields a return which is four times the credit size. In this condition it is common knowledge that the borrower always has the ability to repay a loan. As a consequence any non-repayment of a loan is automatically identified as a strategic default. We compare our baseline condition to a "hidden action" condition in which the return of the borrower is stochastic. With probability p = 2 3 , the borrower's return is four times the credit size. With the counter probability 1 − p = 1 3 , the borrower's return is 0. In the latter case, a borrower cannot make any repayments to the lender and has to default.
8 In this condition the income and behavior of a borrower is not revealed to the paired lender. As a consequence, lenders cannot disentangle whether the non-repayment of a loan is due to a strategic default or a forced default.
Second, we vary the ability of borrowers and lenders to communicate with each other. In the "no communication" condition borrowers cannot communicate with lenders. In the "communication" condition we allow for non-binding pre-play communication. Borrowers can send a text message with a maximum of 300 characters to the paired lender -before the lender makes his decision about the credit size. Lenders can read the message but cannot respond. Borrowers in the communication treatments thus have the possibility to promise that they will (or will not) repay specific credit sizes. Promises are, however, cheap talk because (i) they are non-binding for that period, and (ii) interaction is anonymous and lenders and borrowers are randomly rematched each period.
Our two main variations lead to four treatments which allow us to compare the effect of communication in an economic environment with no ability to hide opportunistic behavior to that in an environment where borrowers can hide opportunistic behavior (see Table 2 for a treatment overview): In the Communication -Baseline (C-B) treatment, lenders and 6 Lenders and Borrowers were told in the instructions that they would receive this aggregate information 7 We discuss lender beliefs in the Appendix. 8 We assume that the borrower's endowment is illiquid and cannot be used to repay a loan.
borrowers interact in a deterministic economic environment in which strategic defaults are automatically revealed. Borrowers can send free form text messages to the paired lender. In the No Communication -Baseline (N-B) treatment, lenders and borrowers interact in a deterministic economic environment and communication is not possible. In the Communication -Hidden Action (C-H) treatment lenders and borrowers interact in a stochastic economic environment in which borrowers can conceal strategic defaults and can communicate with the paired lender. In the No Communication -Hidden Action (N-H) treatment lenders and borrowers again interact in a stochastic economic environment but borrowers cannot communicate with lenders.
In our results section we will compare the effect of communication on lender behavior, borrower behavior and resulting payoffs under hidden action to that under the baseline condition. We are interested in the differential effect of communication between these two conditions. 
Additional Treatments
As emphasized above, the hidden action condition allows borrowers to conceal strategic defaults because their income is stochastic and it is not revealed to lenders. Our conjecture is that this variation will undermine the effectiveness of communication as lenders anticipate that borrowers may be more likely to renege on promises to repay. However, compared to the baseline condition the hidden action condition is also characterized by stochastid borrower income and thus lower expected payoffs for borrowers and lenders. Thus any differential effect of communication between the two conditions could potentially be attributable to the greater uncertainty and/or an income effect, rather than to the ability of borrowers to hide opportunistic behavior.
In order to assess the role of uncertainty and income effects, we study the effect of communication in a third condition. In the "revealed action" condition we replicate our condition with stochastic borrower income, but reveal borrower income and thus borrower repayment choices to the lender after each period. In this condition it is common knowledge that lenders can disentangle whether a borrower defaults strategically or was forced to do so due to lack of income. We again implement a treatment without communication 
Procedures
The experiment was conducted between March and May 2015 (main treatments) and between May and June 2017 (additional treatments) at the University of Hamburg Experimental Laboratory. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using hroot (Bock et al. , 2014) . 600 subjects participated in 30 sessions of the experiment.
10 A session lasted about 80 minutes and 20 subjects participated in each session. Hence, we elicited 2 observations at the matching group level per session. At the end of each session, two periods (one period from period 1-5 and one period from period 6-10) were randomly chosen for payments. Subjects earned on average 13.66 Euro.
11 Roughly half of the subjects were female (53%) and subjects were on average 25 years old.
Upon arrival, subjects had to pick a number from a shuffled deck of cards (numbers 1-20). The number determined their computer cubical and whether they were borrower or lender. Subjects then had to read a set of instructions. While borrowers and lenders had individual instructions, both were informed about the action set and payoff consequences for the respective other role. Before the experiment started, subjects had to answer a set of computerized control questions. The experiment only started after all subjects answered the control questions correctly. After the experiment, we asked subjects to fill in a questionnaire in which we elicited socio economic variables. 
Discussion of the Design
There are four design choices in our experiment which warrant particular discussion. The first relates to the type of uncertainty we implement in the "hidden action" condition. In our experiment, the borrower's investment income is the (only) stochastic variable. Lenders must fear that a borrower may not be able to repay a loan, even if he wants to. Our choice of uncertainty reflects the potential solvency or liquidity risk of borrowers in consumer (or corporate) credit markets. At the same time the stochastic nature of borrowers' income is particularly interesting 9 We thank participants at the 2017 IMEBESS meetings for suggesting these additional treatments 10 Note: The data for the NR and CR treatments were collected in 2017. Therefore, we ran two additional sessions also in the NC and NH treatment to highlight the consistency of subject behavior across years. (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009 ). Communication allows second-movers to signal their type and intentions to first-movers. Thus this direction of communication is particularly important in a strategic situation where the first movers cannot enforce secondmover behavior and have imperfect information about the behavior of second movers.Note that the borrower communication implemented in our experiment stands in contrast to recent field experiments which exogenously vary lender communication (Bursztyn et al. , forthcoming; Karlan et al. , 2016) . This reflects the difference in research questions between the studies. Karlan et al. (2016) and Bursztyn et al. (forthcoming) are interested in how reminders and moral appeals from lenders affect the propensity of borrowers to repay outstanding loans. We are interested in how communication by borrowers about their intended repayment behavior can foster lending in the first place. Second, we allow borrowers to communicate via (freeform) text messages only, rather than communicating face to face with lenders. We choose this type of communication in order to study the effect of communication in an anonymous, one-shot interaction and to be able to rule out any dynamic incentives from potential repeated interaction.
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A third major design choice concerns the strategy space of the lenders. In our experiment lenders could choose either a loan of 10, 40, 70 or 100. They were thus not able to abstain from lending at all. We forced lenders to make a loan of at least 10 in order to circumvent "certainty" effects. Previous research has demonstrated that agents have a strong preference for certain rather than risky (or ambiguous) prospects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . In our experiment, lenders were exposed to the risk of non-repayment no matter what loan size they chose. On the other hand we limited the number of non-minimum loan sizes to three, i.e., a small loan (40), a medium loan (70) and a large loan (100). We chose to limit the strategy space of lenders in order to reduce noise in the data as well as to simplify the elicitation of borrower repayment choices.
Our fourth major design choice was to elicit borrowers repayment decisions with the strategy 13 We are aware that face-to-face communication may enhance cooperation more than anonymous (see, e.g., Balliet, 2009 , for a meta-analysis). However, assuming that treatment effects are constant across conditions, our results should hold.
method. That is, in each period a borrower had to state whether he would repay a loan size of 10, 40, 70 or 100 if (i) he received such a loan, and (ii) he was able to repay the loan (in the hidden action condition). We chose to elicit borrower choices with the strategy method in order to get a complete picture of intended repayment behavior, no matter what loan was actually offered to the borrower. Also, in the hidden action condition (and revealed action condition) we could elicit intended repayment behavior even for those borrowers who were not able to repay. In a survey of the literature Brandts & Charness (2011) find no systematic difference in first-mover or second-mover behavior in trust / investment games which compare the strategy method to direct response elicitation.
Predictions and Hypotheses
Recent evidence suggests that repayment behavior in personal loan markets is influenced by social norms and moral constraints (Guiso et al. , 2013) . Pervious studies of trust games in the field and the lab have likewise documented that second movers do not always keep the received money for themselves (Karlan, 2005; Johnson & Mislin, 2011) . Some first movers anticipate this behavior and send positive amounts to the second mover. In the context of our experiment, we therefore expect that some lenders will offer loans which exceed the minimum credit size and some borrowers will choose to repay loans. In the following we derive predictions for our treatments and establish testable hypotheses for cross-treatment effects. We build on a model in which borrowers differ in their personal (moral) costs of strategic default. Lenders cannot identify borrower types and have heterogenous beliefs about the distribution of borrowers' costs of strategic default.
Borrower and Lender Behavior
We assume that the payoff of a borrower i can be modeled as
where c is the loan amount received and r i (c) = {0; 1} is the repayment decision of the borrower for a loan of size c. The parameter e i is the borrowers endowment, θ is the investment return per unit of credit and β is the required repayment per unit of credit. Each borrower suffers a personal cost k i (c) if she defaults strategically on a loan of size c.
To simplify our analysis we assume in the following that lenders can only offer two loan sizes: c min = 0 and c max > 0. A borrower who has received a loan c max will repay this loan, i.e. r(c max ) = 1, if
( 1) We make three assumptions on borrowers' personal cost of strategic default k i (c max ). First, we assume that personal costs of default are heterogenous across borrowers. Second, we assume that for each borrower the cost of strategic default is higher if she had previously promised to repay that loan. Third, we assume that the personal cost due to a broken promise is higher if the strategic default is revealed to the lender than if it is hidden from the lender.
To be specific, we assume that the personal cost of strategic default in the case of no prior promise to repay k i is distributed uniformly across borrowers on the range [0, k max ], where k max > β * c max . We further assume that for each borrower i the personal cost of default after promising to repay is (1 + α H ) * k i if the strategic default is not revealed to the lender and (1 + α R ) * k i if the strategic default is revealed to the lender, where
Based on the assumptions above we can define four main types of borrowers (see Figure 1 ):
• Type "A" borrowers repay a loan of c max even if they have not promised to do so. These are the borrowers for which: k i ≥ β * c max .
• Type "B" borrowers always repay a loan of c max if they have promised to repay that loan. However, they will not repay if they did not promise to do so. These are the borrowers for which:
• Type "C" borrowers repay a loan of c max only if they have promised to repay that loan and strategic defaults are revealed to lenders. These are the borrowers for which:
• Type "D" borrowers never repay a loan of c max . These are the borrowers for which: For each lender j the expected payoff L j is given by
where p is the probability that the borrower can repay the loan and λ j (c) is the belief of lender j about the repayment choice of the borrower.
A lender j will prefer to offer c max rather than c min = 0 if:
We assume that lenders have heterogenous beliefs about the repayment choice of borrowers λ j (c max ) arising from individual beliefs about the distribution of the personal costs of default k i . All lenders believe that these costs are distributed uniformly across borrowers, but each lender j has an individual belief about the maximum level of these costs b j * k max . We assume that b j is distributed uniformly across lenders over the range [1 − δ, 1 + δ], so that some lenders are overoptimistic about the repayment behavior of borrowers b j > 1 , while others are pessimistic b j < 1. On average, though, lenders' beliefs are consistent with the actual distribution of borrowers' personal costs of strategic default.
Our assumptions on lenders' beliefs allow us to establish the threshold belief b * above which lenders will offer maximum credit c max , conditional on the threshold of personal costs k * above which borrowers are willing to repay such a loan. Suppose a lender with belief b j knows that all borrowers with k i ≥ k * will repay a loan c max . The lenders belief about the repayment choice of any borrower is thus:
Merging equation (2) and (3) we see that -conditional on k * -all lenders will offer the loan c max for which b j is at least:
Predictions by Treatment
Proposition 1 presents our predictions for the three no communication treatments (N-B, N-H, N-R). As borrowers cannot make promises to lenders, the personal cost of strategic default for any borrower is identical in all three treatments. As a consequence, the prediction for borrower behavior (k * ) is identical in all three treatments: only Type A borrowers choose to repay.
The difference in predictions between treatments arises from the fact that the probability that borrowers will be able to repay is higher in the N-B (p = 1) than in the N-H or N-R treatments (p = 2/3). As a consequence, the threshold belief above which a lender will offer the maximum credit (b * )is lower in the N-B than in the N-H or N-R treatments.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria in N-B, N-H and N-R treatments).
• In the no communication treatments, only type A borrowers choose to repay the maximum loan size. The threshold of personal default costs above which loans are repaid is:
• In the N-B treatment, the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
• In the N-H and N-R treatments, the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
. Proof: see appendix.
In the treatments with communication (C-B, C-H, C-R) borrowers can send messages to lenders before the lenders make their decisions. In particular, borrowers can promise to repay loans. As borrowers are heterogenous in their personal cost of strategic default k i and lenders cannot distinguish borrowers by type, the ability to send non-binding messages implies that interaction in the communication treatments resembles a signalling game. Proposition 2 shows that in this signalling game a pooling equilibrium without communication, i.e. an equilibrium in which no borrower promises to repay c max , exists for all three treatments. In such an equilibrium the behavior of borrowers and lenders is identical to that in the corresponding no communication treatments (see Proposition 1).
Proposition 2 (No communication outcome in the C-B, C-H and C-R treatments). In each of the three communication treatments C-B, C-H, C-R there exists a pooling equilbrium with no communication:
• No borrower promises to repay a loan of c max .
• Only Type A borrowers choose to repay c max . The threshold of personal default costs above which loans are repaid is:
• In the C-B treatment the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
.
• In the C-H and C-R treatments the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that a pooling equilibrium with communication, i.e., an equilibrium in which all borrowers promise to repay c max , also exists for all three communication treatments. In this equilibrium a higher share of borrowers repay loans than in the equilibrium without communication for the same treatment. The reason is that for each borrower i the personal cost of strategic default k i is higher after promising to repay. The proposition clarifies that in any equilibrium with communication some borrowers renege on their promises: Those borrowers with low personal costs of strategic default promise to repay, but actually default.
Proposition 3 (Communication equilibria in the C-B, C-H and C-R treatments).
• In all communication treatments, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all borrowers promise to repay a loan of c max .
• In the C-B and C-R treatments, all borrowers of Type A, B and C choose to repay the maximum loan size, while Type D borrowers choose to default. The threshold of personal default costs above which loans are repaid is:
• In the C-H treatment, borrowers of Type A and B choose to repay the maximum loan size, while Type C and D borrowers choose to default. The threshold of personal default costs above which loans are repaid is:
• In the C-B treatment, the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
• In the C-H treatment, the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
• In the C-R treatment, the threshold belief above which lenders choose to offer c max is:
β 2 * cmax kmax * (
Finally, we consider a separating equilibrium in which some borrowers promise to repay c max while other borrowers remain silent and lenders only offer a loan c max to those borrowers who promise to repay. Proposition 4 shows that there is no such separating equilibrium in any of the communication treatments.
Proposition 4 (Separating equilibria in the C-B, C-H and C-R treatments). In the three communication treatments C-B, C-H, C-R there is no separating equilibrium in which some borrowers promise to repay c max while other borrowers remain silent and lenders only offer a loan c max to those borrowers who promise to repay.
Proof: In a separating equilibrium a silent borrower would receive a loan of c min = 0 and thus yield a payoff of: e i . Now consider a borrower with k i (c max ) = 0. This borrower would prefer to deviate and promise to repay c max . The borrower would receive c max and default on that loan, yielding a payoff of e i + θ * c max . Thus the presence of selfish borrowers for whom imitation is costless rules out a separating equilibrium in all treatments with communication.
Hypotheses
We want to test whether the impact of pre-play communication on borrower and lender behavior is undermined when borrowers can hide strategic defaults. The effect of interest in our study is thus a difference-in-difference effects: We will measure the difference in borrower repayment choice and lender credit offers between the C-H and N-H treatment and compare this to the difference in outcomes between the C-B and N-B treatment. Hypothesis 1 presents our predictions for this comparison based on our predictions by treatment in the previous section.
Hypothesis 1 (The effect of communication in the baseline and hidden action conditions).
• In the C-B treatment, borrowers are more likely to chose to repay large credits and lenders are more likely to offer large credits than in the N-B treatment.
• In the C-H treatment, borrowers are more likely to chose to repay large credits and lenders are more likely to offer large credits than in the N-H treatment.
• The impact of communication on borrower behavior is weaker in the hidden action condition (C-H vs.N-H) compared to the baseline condition (C-B vs. N-B).
• The impact of communication on lender behavior may be weaker or stronger in the hidden action condition (C-H vs.N-H) compared to the baseline condition (C-B vs. N-B).
Our predictions suggest that in the C-H treatment two possible equilibria may arise: There is a no-communication equilibrium in which borrower and lender behavior is identical to that in the N-H treatment. In addition, there is a communication equilibrium in which all borrowers promise to repay large loans. In the communication equilibrium of the C-H treatment more borrowers will choose to repay large loans compared to the N-H treatment:
As a consequence, lenders are more likely to offer large loans in the communication equilibrium of the C-H treatment compared to the N-H treatment: b * C−H,com < b * N −H . Thus as long as some lender-borrower pairs play the communication equilibrium in the C-H treatment, we expect more repayment of large loans and more frequent offering of large loans in the C-H compared to the N-H treatment. The same reasoning as above applies to the baseline condition (C-B vs. N-B): As long as some lender-borrower pairs play the communication equilibrium in the C-B treatment we expect more repayment of large loans and more frequent offering of large loans in the C-B compared to the N-B treatment.
Our predictions suggest the treatment effect of communication on borrower behavior should be weaker in the hidden action condition (C-H vs. N-H) compared to the baseline condition (C-B vs. N-B). Proposition 1 suggests that borrower behavior should be identical in the N-H and N-B treatments. Likewise, Proposition 2 suggests that borrower behavior should be identical in the no communication equilibria of the C-H and C-B treatments. Thus the differential effect of communication relies solely on the predictions for the communication equilibria of the C-H and C-B treatments. As shown in Proposition 3, more borrowers will repay loans in the communication equilibrium of the C-B treatment than in the C-H treatment: k * C−B,com > k * C−H,com . Thus as long as the frequency of communication equilibria (as opposed to no-communciation equilibria) is similar in the C-H and C-B treatments we expect a stronger effect of communication on repayment behavior in the baseline compared to the hidden action treatment.
Our predictions suggest that the treatment effect of communication on lender behavior can be weaker or stronger in the hidden action condition (C-H vs. N-H) compared to the baseline condition (C-B vs. N-B). Assuming that communication equilibria are equally frequent in the C-H and C-B treatment the relevant comparison is the difference b compared to the difference b * C−B,com − b * N −B . From propositions 1 and 3 we can see that there are two countervailing effects at play: On the one hand communication has a weaker impact on borrower repayment choices in the hidden action condition (see above). On the other hand, due to stochastic borrower income the threshold belief b * (k * ) required for lenders to offer credit is higher cet. par. in the hidden action condition compared to the baseline condition (see Equation (2)). This implies that for a given increase in the share of borrowers who repay (and thus reduction in k * ) the decrease in the threshold belief is larger in the hidden action than in the baseline condition.
As summarized by Hypothesis 1 our main prediction is that the impact of communication on borrowers' repayment behavior is weaker in the hidden action than in the baseline condition. We conjecture that the mechanism driving this effect is that when strategic defaults are not revealed to lenders, less borrowers feel compelled to honor their promises to repay. In our empirical analysis we will compare borrower promises and subsequent repayment behavior in the C-B and C-H treatment. Hypothesis 2 summarizes our predictions for this comparison.
Hypothesis 2 (Promises and repayment behavior in the C-B and C-H treatments).
• Borrowers are equally likely to promise to repay (large) loans in the C-H and C-B treatments.
• In the C-H treatment, borrowers are more likely to break a promise to repay than in the C-B treatment.
• Lenders are less likely to offer large credit to borrowers who promise to repay in the C-H treatment than in the C-B treatment.
Proposition 3 suggests that a communication equilibrium in which all borrowers promise to repay large credit is equally feasible in the C-H and C-B treatments. Thus there is no reason to expect that borrowers make less promises in one treatment than in the other. From Proposition 3 we see that the share of borrowers which keeps their promise is lower in the C-H than in the C-B treatment (k * C−H,com > k * C−B,com ). Again from Proposition 3 we see that fewer lenders will offer large credit in communication equilibria of the C-H treatment compared to communication equilibria of the C-B treatment (b * C−H,com > b * C−B,com ). As discussed in Section 2.3 any differential effect of communication in the hidden action condition compared to the baseline condition could be attributable to the income and uncertainty effects of stochastic borrower income, rather than to the ability of borrowers to hide opportunistic behavior. To disentangle the role of hidden action from the role of stochastic income per se, we examine the effect of communication in our revealed action condition. This condition is identical to the hidden action condition except that the realized borrower income is revealed ex-post to the lender. This allows the lender to distinguish strategic defaults from forced defaults. If the effect of communication in the hidden action condition is weakened due to the increased uncertainty and lower expected income of lenders then we would expect a similar weak effect of communication in the revealed action condition. By contrast, if the ability to hide opportunistic behavior is responsible for the weak effect of communication in the hidden action condition, then we should see stronger effects of communication in the revealed action condition. Hypothesis 3 summarizes our conjecture that hidden action rather than uncertainty and income effects drive the weak effect of communication in the hidden action condition:
Hypothesis 3 (Repayment behavior and lending in the C-R and N-R treatments).
• In the C-R treatment, borrowers are more likely to choose to repay large credits and lenders are more likely to offer large credits than in the N-R treatment.
• The impact of communication on borrower and lender behavior is weaker in the hidden action condition (C-H vs.N-H) compared to the revealed action condition (C-R vs. N-R).
Results
We report our findings in two subsections. In Section 4.1, we test Hypothesis 1 by comparing the effect of communication across our two main conditions: the hidden action condition and the baseline condition. We confirm a significant weaker treatment effect of communication on credit market outcomes in the hidden action condition. In Section 4.2 we examine the mechanism behind this differential treatment effect. Here, we first confirm Hypothesis 2 by documenting that borrowers are more likely to break promises to repay in the hidden action condition. We then confirm Hypothesis 3 by showing that in our revealed action treatment (as opposed to the hiddden action treatment) communication has a significant impact on borrower and lender behavior. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our main outcome variables by treatment. The table reports the average credit size (Credit Size), the mean frequency of intended strategic defaults (ISD), the mean of borrower profits (Borrower Profit) and the mean of lender profits (Lender Profit) for each treatment at the matching group level. 
The Effect of Communication: Hidden action vs. Baseline condition
We first report the effect of communication in our baseline condition, comparing outcomes in the C-B treatment to the N-B treatment. Table 3 documents a 62% increase in the average credit size in the C-B treatment (75) compared to the N-B treatment (46.3). A two sided rank-sum test at the matching group level confirms that this increase is statistically significant (N=20, p<0.01).
14 Panel A of Figure 2 confirms that communication impacts on lender behavior in the baseline condition. Lenders offer the maximum credit size 100 significantly more often in the C-B treatment (62%) compared to the N-B treatment (18.4%).
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Communication also has a significant positive impact on borrower behavior in the baseline condition. Table 3 reveals only a marginal decline in the overall intended strategic default (ISD) rate in the C-B treatment (65%) compared to the N-B treatment (62%) (N=20, p=0.47). However, Panel B of Figure 2 shows that the ISD rate for credits of size 100 decreases significantly from 60 percentage points in the N-B to 42 percentage points in the C-B treatment (N=20, p=0.044). Table 4 examines intended strategic default at the borrower-period level, conditional on the loan size offered and the treatment. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy variable which is one if the borrower intends to default strategically. Explanatory variables are dummy variables for the different credit sizes (CS 40 -CS 100), with credit size (10) as the ommitted category. Columns (1-3) present findings for the C-B and N-B treatments. Column 1 and 2 present separate regressions for each treatment. In Column 3, we present pooled regression results for the two treatments and include interaction terms between the different credit size dummies and the communication treatment dummy (CS 40 × Comm, CS 70 × Comm and CS 100 × Comm). The table presents estimates of linear within treatment (GLS) regressions with standard errors clustered at the matching group level. All regressions include borrower and period fixed effects.
The Column 1 results in Table 4 show no significant difference in repayment behavior by loan size in the N-B treatment. By contrast, the Column 2 estimates show that in the C-B treatment the likelihood of a strategic default is significantly lower for the maximum credit 21 size of 100 compared to the minimum credit site of 10.
17 Pooling observations across the two treatments (Column 3) we confirm that the intended strategic default rate is lower for credit size 100 than credit size 10 only in the C-B treatment. In our baseline condition, communication leads to an increase in the frequency of large loans and a reduction in strategic defaults on such loans. As a consequence both lenders and borrowers earn more in the treatment with communication. Borrowers earn on average 329 points in the C-B treatment compared to 291 points in the N-B treatment (N=20, p=0.012). The strategic default rate is also significantly lower for credits of 100 than for credits of 70 (F-test: F(1,9)=5.96, p=0.04) and compared to credits of 40 (F-test: F(1,9)=6.19, p=0.03).
than in the N-B treatment. Communication leads to a pareto improvement: both borrowers and lenders yield higher average payoffs in the C-B compared to the N-B treatment.
We next examine the effect of communication in the hidden action condition by comparing outcomes in the C-H treatment to the N-H treatment. The summary statistics in Table 3 show that the average credit size offered by lenders is 30% higher in the C-H treatment (58.2) compared to the N-H treatment (45.10). This increase is stastistically significant (N=20, p=0.05). Figure 3 shows that the frequency of loans of size 100 almost doubles from 19% in the N-H treatment to 35% in the C-H treatment (N=20, p=0.03).While communication does impact credit volume in the hidden action condition it should be noted that the magnitude of the effect is only half of that in the baseline condition. Table 3 shows that there is only a marginal decline in intended strategic default between the C-H and the N-H treatment (N=20, p=0.41). Figure 3 shows that the intended strategic default rate for credit size 100 falls from 63% in the N-H treatment to 55% in the C-H treatment. This difference is however statistically not significant (N=20, p=0.36). We also observe very similar repayment behavior between the two treatments for the other credit sizes.
18 The regression analysis in columns (4-6) of Table 4 confirms this result. Communication does not seem to impact significantly on borrower behavior in the hidden action condition. Table 3 and Figure 3 show that there is a slight -but insignificant increase in borrower profits from the N-H treatment (233.7) to the C-H treatment (249.8) (N=20, p=0.19). The average profit of lenders hardly differs between the two treatments (N=20, p=0.65).
Result 1. B (The effect of communication in the hidden action condition). Lenders offer
larger credit volumes in the C-H compared to the N-H treatment but borrowers are not more likely to repay large loans. Communication does not lead to a significant increase in average lender or borrower profits.
Our analysis so far suggests that communication has a significant positive effect on all credit market outcomes in the baseline condition. By contrast, the effect of communication is much weaker in the hidden action condition. To formally test for differential treatment effects of communication across the two conditions, we present results from difference -in -difference regressions in Table 5 . The table presents results for six dependent variables: Credit size (CS -Column 1), credit size 100 (CS 100 -Column 2), the average intended strategic default per borrower and period (ISD -Column 3), the frequency of intended strategic defaults for credits of 100 (ISD 100 -Column 4), borrower profit (B Profit -Column 5) and lender profit (L Profit -Column 6). The explanatory variables are Baseline, a dummy variable indicating the The results presented in Table 5 confirm that there is a significant weaker impact of communication on credit market outcomes in the hidden action condition compared to the baseline condition. The interaction term Baseline x Communication is large and significant for credit volume (Columns 1-2) and lender profits (Column 6). The interaction term is also sizeable for borrower repayment behavior (Column 4) and borrower profits (Column 5), however it is imprecisely estimated in both cases.
Result 1. C (Differential effect of communication in hidden action vs. baseline condition).
The positive effect of communication on credit volume and lender profits is significantly weaker in the hidden action condition compared to the baseline condition. 
Mechanism: Hidden action and promise breaking
Our results in the previous section suggest that an economic condition in which uncertainty allows borrowers to conceal strategic default undermines the benefits of borrower-lender communication. In this section we provide evidence which supports our conjecture that it is indeed the ability of borrowers to hide opportunistic behavior which reduces the effectiveness of communication.
Borrower promises and behavior
In this section we report on borrower-lender communication in our C-H and C-B treatments as well as subsequent behavior by borrowers and lenders. We show that borrowers are much more likely to break their promises to repay loans in the C-H compared to the C-B treatment. As a consequence lenders offer less credit to borrowers who promise repayment in the C-H than the C-B treatment.
First, we explore how often and what borrowers communicate to their paired lender. Table  6 presents summary statistics for coded chat variables. The table first presents the frequency of borrower-lender communication (Messaging). The table also illustrates the type of messages communicated by borrowers to the paired lender. Promise captures borrower promises to repay a specified credit. The variable summarizes all promises for the different credit sizes. Promise 100 captures promises to repay credits of 100 only. Request is a variables describing a borrower request for a certain credit size. The variable summarizes all request for the different credit sizes. Request 100 summarizes the requests for credits of 100. Threat is a variable which captures a threat to repay only specific credits. The variable summarizes all threats for the different credit sizes. Threat 100 presents threats to only repay credits of 100. Note: Summary statistics for coded chat variables. Variables describe mean of matching group averages with standard deviation in parentheses. Messaging captures any incidence of borrower communication with the paired lender. Promise captures borrower promises to repay a specified credit. The variable summarizes all promises for the different credit sizes. Promise 100 highlights mean promises to repay credits of 100. Request is a variables describing a borrower request for a certain credit size. The variable summarizes all request for the different credit sizes. Request 100 summarizes the mean of request for credits of 100. Threat is a variable describing a threat to repay only specific credits. The variable summarizes all threats for the different credit sizes. Threat 100 presents mean of threats to only repay credits of 100.Note that Threat, Request and Promise 10-100 are dummy variables that are one if a borrower threats, requests or promises to repay any credit size. Borrowers can make multiple threats, promises or requests within a message. Table 6 shows that borrowers send messages 71% of the time in the C-H treatment, compared to 66% of the time in the C-B treatment. This treatment difference is small and statistically insignificant (N= 20, p=0.47) . Treatment conditions do, however, influence the type of messages that borrowers send to the paired lender. The most common message in both treatments is the 19 Note: Borrowers could make multiple promises, requests or threats to lenders within one message. Messages (983) of borrowers were coded by three research assistants independently. Research assistants were unaware of the research question and at least two coders had to agree that a message falls into a certain category for a variable to be included in the analysis. We use Krippendorff's α as a measure for inter-coder reliability (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) . All categories included in the analysis are either above (Threat 10-100=0.89;Threat 100=0.87; Request 100=0.68) or close (Request 10-100=0.57; Promise 10-100=0.61; Promise 100=0.63) to the cut-off value proposed by Krippendorff (α = 0.667). Furthermore, our values are in and above the values reported in other economic experiments (see, e.g., Bartling et al. , 2017; Brandts et al. , 2014; Cason et al. , 2017; Eisenkopf, 2014; Leibbrandt & Sääksvuori, 2012) . Coder instructions are available upon request.
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promise to repay a credit of 100. Borrowers who send messages are more likely to make such a promise in the C-B treatment (46.6% ) compared to C-H treatment(35.6%). This treatment difference is marginally significant (N= 20, p=0.08). The second most frequent message is a request for the maximum credit size 100. Requests for large credits are much more frequent in the C-B treatment (42.6%) than in the C-H treatment (17.8%) (N= 20, p<0.01) . Comparing the type of messages communicated by borrowers in the C-H treatment it is apparaent that they are much more hesitant to request high credits than they are to promise to repay such loans (if they can).
Consistent with our predictions, treatment conditions have a strong effect on whether borrowers adhere to their promises. In Panel A of Figure 4 , we report the intended strategic default rate for loans of 100 (ISD 100) conditional on borrower communication. The first bar (light grey) reports ISD 100 for those borrowers who promise to repay such a loan (ISD 100 -Promise 100). The second bar (dark grey) reports ISD 100 for those borrowers who request a credit of 100 (ISD 100 -Request 100). The results show that borrowers are much more likely to break their repayment promises when their actual repayment behavior is hidden. In the C-B borrowers break their promises about 15.6% of the time compared to 32..2% in the C-H treatment (N=20, p=0.07). Likewise, borrowers who explicitly request credit of 100 are much more likely to default in the C-H treatment (53.7%) compared with borrowers in the C-B treatment (17%), (N=20, p=0.02).
Lenders anticipate that borrowers are more likely to renege on ther promises in the hidden action condition. Panel B of Figure 4 reveals that lenders give credits of 100 84.4% of the time after receiving a message containing a repayment promise for this credit size in the C-B treatment (light grey bar -Repayment Promise 100). Borrower requests for such credits are granted with equal frequency (83.4%) as the variable Credit Request 100 (dark grey bar) shows. In the C-H treatment, lenders are less likely to respond to promises (47.1%), (N=20, p<0.01) and request (37.1%), (N=20, p<0.01) of borrowers. Notes: Panel A of the figure presents the mean frequency with which lenders give credits of 100 in the CB, CH, and CR treatment conditional on receiving a promise to repay a credit of 100 (light grey bars) or a request for a credit of 100 (dark grey bars). Panel B of the figure shows the mean intended strategic default rate for borrowers who promise to repay credits of 100 (light grey bars) and borrowers who request credits of 100 (dark grey bars).
Result 2 (Borrower promises, repayment and credit in the C-B and C-H treatments). In the C-H treatment, borrowers are more likely to break promises to repay than in the C-B treatment.
In the C-H treatment, lenders are less likely offer large credit sizes to borrowers who promise to repay than in the C-B treatment.
Hidden action vs. uncertainty
In this section we report on lender behavior, borrower behavior and payoffs in the revealed action condition. As discussed in Section 2.3 this condition is identical to the hidden action condition except that the borrowers income is revealed ex-post to the lender. This allows the lender to distinguish strategic defaults from forced defaults. If the effect of communication in the hidden action condition was weakened due to the increased uncertainty and lower expected income of lenders then we would expect a similar weak effect of communication in these treatments with revealed action. By contrast, if the ability to hide opportunistic behavior is responsible for the weak effect of communication in the hidden action condition, then we should see stronger effects of communication in the revealed action condition. Table 3 shows that the average credit size is significantly higher in the C-R treatment (63.1) compared to the N-R treatment (41.3) (N=20, p<0.01). Panel A of Figure 5 shows that this increase in average credit size is driven by a higher the frequency of maximum credit sizes in the C-R treatment (45%) compared to N-R treatment (15%) (N=20, p<0.01). Table 3 and Panel B of Figure 5 further reveals a significant impact of communication on borrower behavior in the revealed action condition. On average the intended strategic default rate falls from 61.3% in the N-R treatment to 53.7% C-R treatment (N=20, p=0.09). In particular, the intended strategic default rate for credits of 100 decreases from (62.6%) in the N-R treatment to (45.6%) in the C-R treatment (N=20, p<0.01). In the revealed action condition communication leads to a pareto improvement. Lenders' profits significantly increase from 135.4 in the N-R treatment to 148.3 in the C-R treatment (N=20, p=0.04). Borrower profits increase from 227.5 in the N-R treatment to 251.9 in the C-R treatment (N=20, p=0.02).
Result 3 (The effect of communication in the revealed action condition). When borrower behavior is revealed to lenders ex-post, communication increases credit volume and borrower repayment even if the economic environment is uncertain. Similar to the baseline condition with deterministic income communication leads to higher profits for both borrowers and lenders. is significantly less often than the 32% in the C-H treatment (N=20, p=0.06). Similarly, the intended strategic default rate after requesting credits of 100 is significantly lower in the C-R (19%) than in the C-H (53.7%) (N=20, p=0.03).
Panel B of Figure 4 shows that lenders respond differently to borrower communication in the C-R compared with the C-H treatment. Following a borrower request for a credit size of 100 lenders give a credit of 100 70.1% of the time in the C-R treatment compared to only 37% in the C-H treatment (N=20, p=0.01). Borrower promises to repay a credit of size 100 are also more likely to trigger a corresponding loan in the C-R treatment (55.8%) than in the C-H treatment (47.1%). However, the latter effect is not statistically significant (N=20, p=0.4).
The results presented above support our conjecture that it is the ability to hide strategic defaults which undermines the effectiveness of communication in our hidden action condition. Once borrower behavior is revealed to lenders -as in our revealed action condition -communication leads to a significant increase in gains from trade -even if borrower income is stochastic.
Discussion
In this paper, we study the impact of communication in an economic environment where agents can hide opportunistic behavior from their trading partner. The results of our person-toperson lending experiment reveals that borrowers are much more likely to renege on promises to lenders in an environment where opportunistic behavior is not revealed to lenders ex-post. As a consequence, the possibility to make non-binding promises to repay loans has a much weaker impact on credit market outcomes in an environment with hidden action than in an environment with deterministic income.
Real-life credit markets are plagued by asymmetric information and thus potential opportunistic behavior by borrowers. It is often difficult for lenders to assess whether a particular loan default was triggered by an economic shock to the borrower, or is the result of a strategic default. Our evidence suggests that pre-contractual communication between borrowers and lenders may have only a limited impact on borrowers' repayment behavior and lenders' provision of credit in such markets. Thus while existing evidence suggests that pre-play communication may have significant beneficial outcomes in a wide range of social dilemma situations (Balliet, 2009) , our evidence suggests that these findings may not transmit to risky credit markets. Moreover, while recent field experiments suggest that post-contractual reminders may foster loan repayment (Bursztyn et al. , forthcoming; Karlan et al. , 2016) , our evidence suggests that pre-contractual borrower-lender communication may be less effective.
Our findings have important implications in view of the recent trend towards online len-ding technologies. Compared to loan contracts which are negotiated and signed in person, online lending by banks and peer-to-peer lenders limits the ability of borrowers and lenders to communicate with each other in the pre-contracting phase. Previous evidence from behavioral economics and psychology would suggest that the absence of person-to person communication in online lending may impair repayment morale of borrowers. Our results qualify this concern. We find that person-to-person communication may have a very limited impact on repayment behavior in an economic environment where borrowers can hide their ability to repay behind stochastic incomes. The absence of person-to-person communication may therefore not be a significant drawback to these new lending technologies. In the no communication treatments borrowers cannot make promises to lenders. Thus for each borrower we have k i (c max ) = k i . From Equation (1) therefore only the borrowers for which k i ≥ β * c max will repay a loan c max . These are (by definition) the Type "A" borrowers. For the no communication treatments we therefore have k *
Lender behavior in the N-B Treatment: In the N-B treatment borrowers can always repay a loan (p = 1). From Equation (4) we therefore have:
From above . From Equation (4) we therefore have:
From above we know that k * . For a pooling equilibrium without communication to exist, no borrower must have an incentive to deviate and promise to repay c max . This is the case if lenders have off-equilibrium beliefs that any borrower who does promise to repay c max will actually default.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (Communication outcome in the C-B, C-H and C-R treatments)
Borrower behavior in the C-B and C-R treatments: Consider a pooling equilibrium with communication in the C-B and C-R treatments. In these treatments strategic defaults are revealed to lenders. Thus if a borrower promises to repay, her costs of strategic default are:
In communication equilibria where all borrowers promise to pay, all borrowers with k i * (1+α R ) ≥ β * c max will thus choose to repay. These are (by definition) the Type "A", Type "B" and Type "C" borrowers. We therefore have k *
Borrower behavior in the C-H treatment: In the C-H treatment strategic defaults are not revealed to lenders. Thus if a borrower promises t, repay her costs of strategic default are:
In a communication equilibrium where all borrowers promise to pay, all borrowers with k i * (1 + α H ) ≥ β * c max will thus choose to repay. These are (by definition) the Type "A", and Type "B" borrowers. We therefore have k *
Lender behavior in the C-B Treatment: In the C-B treatment borrowers can always repay a loan (p = 1). From Equation (4) we therefore have:
From above we know that:
Lender behavior in the C-H Treatment: In the C-H treatments we have p = 
From above we know that: k * . From Equation (4) we therefore have:
From above we know that: k * C−R,com = β * cmax 1+α R . Therefore we have: b * C−H,com = β 2 * p * cmax kmax * (β * p−1) * (1+α R )
For a pooling equilibrium with communication to be sustained, no borrower must have an incentive to deviate and remain silent. This is the case if lenders have off-equilibrium beliefs that any borrower who does not promise to repay c max will actually default.
A.2 Borrower behavior over time Figure 6 depicts the average strategic default rate for each credit size over time. Panels A-D show strategic default rates in the N-B, C-B, N-H and C-H treatments, repectively. The figure shows that there is an upward trend in strategic default for all credit sizes over time in all treatments. The regressions presented in Table 7 and Table 8 confirm the graphical results presented in Figure 6 . The tables present linear GLS regressions with individual borrower fixed effects. The dependent variables are a borrower's decision to strategic default on the different credit sizes. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the matching group level and explanatory variables are period dummies to capture the time trends. From the tables it is apparent that the strategic default rate for all credit sizes increases over time in all treatments. 
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A.3 Lender behavior over time Figure 7 by presenting linear fixed effect GLS regressions for lender behavior over all ten periods of the experiment. The dependent variable in all regression is a lender's decision to issue a credit of different size. We include individual fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the unique matching group level in all regressions. The results confirm the time trends depicted in figure 7. Credit sizes significantly decline in the treatments without communication (N-B, N-H) but are stable over time in the respective communication treatments (C-B, C-H). 
A.4 Lender beliefs
In period 1, 6, and 10 we elicited lenders' beliefs concerning the share of borrowers who would repay a loan of each loan size in that period. Prior to this elicitation in periods 6 and 10 we presented the lenders with information on aggregate repamyent behavior of the five borrowers in their matching group for all previous periods. In this appendix we provide evidence that lenders update their beliefs correctly over time. Table 10 , Panel A presents lender beliefs in period one of the experiment. Before borrowers make their first repayment decision and before lenders first decide which credit to give to the paired borrower beliefs about strategic default for high credits are very similar across all treatments. Panel B and Panel C demonstrate a shift in beliefs in the C-B treatment. By period six, lenders expect that 48% of the borrowers strategic default on their credits in the C-B treatment. By contrast, the beliefs about borrower defaults in the other treatments increase over time. Table 11 provides statistical evidence for the differences in lender beliefs over time. The table presents within treatment GLS regressions with individual fixed effects for lender beliefs over time. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the matching group level. The table confirms the descriptive statistic results from table 10. The regressions highlight that within all treatments lenders adjust their beliefs about the strategic default rate in their matching group upwards. An exception are the beliefs about strategic defaults of credits 100 in the C-B treatment (Column 4 in Panel B). In this treatments, lenders adjust their beliefs downwards.
We present Figure 8 as an example of how well lenders adjust their beliefs (and lending decisions) to the borrowers repayment behavior. The figure graphically highlights a lenders' belief about borrower strategic default rate for credits of 100 (light grey bar), the average percentage of credits 100 issued by the lenders (dark grey bar) and the average strategic default rate of credits 100 (black bar). Panel A-D describes the behavior in the N-B, C-B, N-H and C-H treatments respectively. The figure shows that lenders initially overestimate the strategic default rate within their matching group but adjust their beliefs over time. Beliefs about strategic default and actual strategic default rates become more and more aligned as the experiment proceeds. The figure also shows that high beliefs about strategic default also directly translate into low credit volumes. It is apparent form Figure 8 that communication only impacts on beliefs and credit sizes in the communication treatments where borrower behavior is revealed (C-B treatment). In fact, it is in these treatment where lenders adjust their overestimated beliefs about strategic default rates downwards and increase the frequency with which they give credits of 100. Treatment -N-B and N-H: 2015 Treatment -N-B and N-H: and 2017 Treatment -N-B and N-H: N-B -2015 Treatment -N-B and N-H: N-B -2017 Treatment -N-B and N-H: N-H-2015 Treatment -N-B and N-H: N-H -2017 Note: Mean of matching group averages with standard deviation in parentheses. Mean credit size (Credit Size, mean of realized strategic defaults over all credits (RSD), the mean of borrower profits (Borrower Profit) and the mean of lender profits (Lender Profit).
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